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Launch Safety Principles for Reusable Launch Vehicles

By Robert W. Eleazer, III and Daniel D. Berlinrut

Safety will be a major consideration in the operation of Reusable Launch
Vehicles (RLVs), regardless of the location of the launch facility. While frequently it is
asserted that RLVs will be operated in a manner more similar to aircraft than
Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs), RLVs potentially are at least as hazardous as
ELVs. However, RLVs will have aspects, features, and capabilities which may alter
approaches to meeting safety requirements.

Basic Launch Safety Principles
Launch safety is sometimes called "Range Safety" or even "Flight Safety".
Launch safety includes protection from not only the actual launch, but encompasses
orbital and re-entry flight modes and ground-based processing, testing, and recovery.
All of these issues require the watchful eye of an accountable and responsible range
operator.
Launch of rocket powered vehicles is inherently a hazardous undertaking. The
explosive potential of the vehicles is enormous; this is complicated by the fact that the
vehicles move very quickly and could theoretically reach any place in the world literally in
a matter of minutes. The basis for determining what is and is not acceptable in terms of
public safety is very simple. In Public Law 60 the 81st Congress specified that the public
will not be exposed to dangers greater than that from conventional aircraft flying
overhead. This equates to a risk of 30 X 10-6, or one death in the general public every
1,000 years for a rate of 33 launches a year. The situation becomes more complex as
risks for ground-based operations also must be accounted for as well as the unique RLV
post-launch risks.
While RLVs differ in a number of aspects from ELVs, during ascent they present
essentially the same level of hazard. A representative single stage to orbit liquid
hydrogen/liquid oxygen fueled RLV weighing 2 million pounds at liftoff represents an
explosive potential approximately equivalent to 1000 tons of TNT. One frequently heard
argument is that RLVs will have reliabilities similar to commercial aircraft and therefore
can be operated in a similar manner. This is unproved at best. Even if RLV reliabilities
eventually prove to be that high, it will take some time to demonstrate them and probably
will require at least dozens and probably even hundreds of flights. And in any case, the
potential hazard presented during at least the early portions of the flight will exceed
those for any commercial aircraft due to the considerable explosive potentials as noted
above. Also, the fact remains that even commercial aircraft of demonstrated reliability
are limited as to where and how they can operate. For such aircraft, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) imposes standards and limitations on such factors as
runway lengths, glide paths, and cruising altitudes. For experimental aircraft, including
those of limited performance and possessing relatively little potential hazard, the
standards are even stricter. Even for the most proven operational aircraft, stringent FAA
regulations apply should significant quantities of hazardous materials be carried (as will
inevitably be the case for launch propellants of the launch vehicle and its payload).
In summary, we can state with near-certainty that RLVs will not be allowed to
present a greater danger to the public than do ELVs. Both types of vehicles will be
allowed to kill the same number of people: zero!

Traditional Risk Mitigation Approaches

Recognizing the substantial risks inherent in space boosters and ballistic
missiles, the Air Force and NASA have developed approaches to reduce the risk to an
acceptable level. The risk is mitigated by:
a. Location of launch complexes in uninhabited areas.
b. Limiting allowed trajectories to reduce exposure to the population
c. Requiring risk mitigation systems, such as commanded destruct systems
(Flight Termination Systems, abbreviated as FTS) and Inadvertent Separation Systems,
(ISS) to destroy the vehicle should it wander off course or break up in flight. Typically,
these systems use explosive destruction of the vehicle.
d. Limiting acceptable weather conditions, both to protect FTS and ISS from
hazards such as lightning and to reduce the population's exposure to hazards in the
event of a failure.
Generally speaking, these same approaches will be appropriate for RLVs.
However, RLVs present both new safety challenges as well as some potential new
opportunities for addressing risk mitigation.

Characteristics of RLVs
RLVs do have some characteristics which set them apart from ELVs and may
alter the risk mitigation requirements and approaches. These are:
a. Single stage to orbit (SSTO) RLVs do not have stages, thereby limiting the
vehicle's inherent ability to break up and distribute itself over larger areas.
b. SSTO RLVs may be significantly larger than any single stage or component of
any other previous launch vehicle.
c. RLVs will require both launch and landing operations, presenting an additional
safety and support challenge over ELVs.
d. RLVs may have an ascent abort capability, which offers a potential alternative
to commanded destruction. Aborts could be to the area of the launch facility, to a
downrange site, or to a ÒdisposalÓ site in the ocean or another suitably deserted area.
e. RLVs may have an engine-out capability which could increase their reliability
and decrease the risk they present.
f. RLVs probably will be liquid fueled only, most likely with only cryogenic
propellants, and therefore will be relatively inert until a few hours before launch.

Overall Risk Mitigation Approaches
Taking traditional safety requirements into account along with unique RLV
characteristics, we can reach some conclusions.
a. Launch areas should still be located in remote areas, just as has been done
for ELVs.
b. Toxic material hazards may be reduced substantially over current ELVs but
there will be new factors in this area that must be taken into account, including re-entry
and recovery of the vehicle.
c. Trajectory restrictions currently used for ELV launches from Cape Canaveral
Air Station (CCAS) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) should be sufficient to handle
the risks presented by RLVs for the traditionally approved launch azimuths.

d. New approaches will be needed to enable RLVs to fly trajectories outside the
limits currently used for ELVs.
e. Risk mitigation systems will have to take into account the ability of RLVs to
abort flight during ascent.
f. Explosive destruction should be avoided if at all possible for SSTO RLVs,
since it spreads the debris over a larger area. Also, for SSTO RLVs, ISS installations
are not required.
g. RLVs using gliding, unpowered approaches do not appear to be likely to
present serious safety challenges; it may be possible to reduce safety oversight
significantly during the landing phase in manner similar to the approach used for the
Space Shuttle. However, they also will require extensive meteorological forecasting
support in order to address both safety concerns and vehicle limitations.
h. Current techniques used to protect launch crews and other essential
personnel during ELV and the Space Shuttle operations should continue to be used.
RLVs do not appear to present any special challenges in this regard.
The most significant portions of these areas are discussed in following sections.

Location of Launch Complexes
The location of launch complexes and landing fields in relatively remote and
unpopulated areas is standard practice at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) and the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). A typical limit on inhabited buildings near the launch
complex for large RLVs would be approximately 3500 ft using current standards. This
Quantity Distance (QD) requirement is substantial but should not be particularly difficult
to achieve on CCAS and KSC, depending on the number of launch facilities required.
However, the stationary QD is small in comparison to the Flight Hazard Area (FHA),
which will be highly dependent on the characteristics of the vehicle and the specific
mission trajectory. Given the geographic layout of CCAS and KSC and the predicted
total launch activity, it is likely that some personnel evacuations will be required during
launch operations as well as limited restrictions placed on non-launch test operations.
It is preferable that RLV launch complexes be located relatively close to landing
areas; this is not only more convenient but may obviate the need for specialized
handling and transportation equipment. The SLC-48 site which has been identified on
CCAS can meet these requirements, although there will be some impact on SLC-36
Atlas, SLC-17 Delta, and SLC-46 operations on launch days. Routing of taxiways from
the CCAS Skid Strip to the SLC-48 site does not appear to present any significant
problems in regards to surface traffic, but some minor alteration of utility systems would
be required.
On Kennedy Space Center (KSC), it does not appear to be feasible to locate the
RLV launch pads in very close proximity to the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF). The
required Flight Hazard Area for such a siting would force evacuations of areas such as
the VAB and possibly LC-39A and LC-39B as well; these will likely be unacceptable to
NASA. The best locations for new RLV pads on KSC is North of the current Space
Shuttle launch facilities. This will entail the construction of significant new taxiways but
may be very compatible with the construction of a new runway, which would in turn
improve availability of the runway relative to vehicle weather restrictions.
For horizontal take off RLVs, the existing runways at CCAS and KSC cause
some safety concerns. The KSC SLF is 15,000 ft long, has a concrete surface, and it's
Northwest end is located in a remote area suitable for a propellant loading area's QD, all

major advantages for RLV use. However, for easterly launches the ascent trajectory
would take the vehicle over or near the Space Shuttle processing facilities, the KSC
Industrial Area and the CCAS Industrial Area. Depending on the size of the RLV
evacuations of these areas might be required. For polar orbit missions it is likely that
departures from the SLF would be to the Northwest and over flight of Titusville and other
communities in that area would be a limitation.
The CCAS Skid Strip is asphalt and 10,000 ft long. It's Northwest end is near
payload processing areas, so evacuations may be required for the fueling of horizontal
take off RLVs. This may be feasible if required, since the time required for fueling
should not be more than a few hours. Thanks to the Southeastern end of the Skid
Strip's proximity to the ocean, ascent trajectory considerations for equatorial orbits
should be minimal. Trajectories to polar orbits departing the Skid Strip to the Northwest
would have to take into account over flight of the CCAS and KSC Industrial Areas.
For horizontal takeoff RLV's the use of a concrete runway would be preferable to
reduce the hazard associated with a propellant spill or an accident. Further studies of
the mission requirements will be required to determine if the Skid Strip can handle
horizontal take off RLVs. Resurfacing of the Skid Strip with concrete is technically
feasible. In any case, the runway load capability will also be a factor and may drive the
requirement for resurfacing in any case.

Ascent Trajectory Considerations
ELVs and the Space Shuttle are trajectory-limited due to safety considerations.
During the initial portion of the trajectory, the vehicles cannot overfly populated areas;
this is handled by limiting flight to over the open oceans and by warning water and air
traffic to stay away. During the later portions of the trajectory, some land overflight is
allowed, since the vehicle's reduced explosive yield, higher velocity, and very high
altitude reduces the threat to populations. For launches from Cape Canaveral Air
Station (CCAS) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch azimuths are limited from
approximately 37 degrees to about 114 degrees. These equate to direct-injection orbital
inclinations of approximately 57 degrees to 28 degrees.
Orbital inclinations of greater than 57 degrees have not been flown from CCAS or
KSC due to range safety considerations. A trajectory to achieve direct injection sunsynchronous polar orbits has been proposed and involves a northwesterly trajectory
which crosses the Georgia coastline and continues over central South Carolina. Such
trajectories will require new risk mitigation approaches but may be possible given the
unique characteristics of RLVs.

Toxic Hazards
Toxic hazards are associated with the exhaust plumes of vehicles during ascent,
from venting of propellants, and from the spread and combustion of propellants and
structural materials associated with explosive destruction of the vehicle.
Most RLVs intend to utilize either LOX/Liquid Hydrogen or LOX/Kerosene
propulsion systems. This will limit but not eliminate the hazards associated with exhaust
plumes. However, for horizontal take-off RLVs, during ascent the vehicles will remain
relatively close to the ground during a longer period, so the toxic hazard presented will
be somewhat greater than with comparable vertical launch vehicles.

During either normal operations or emergencies, such as aborts during ascent,
RLVs may need to vent propellants in flight prior to landing. Venting of hydrogen in the
area of the Ozone Layer is be a concern and will likely require that venting be restricted
in some manner.
RLVs will likely use substantial amounts of composite materials. Some of these
materials can produce toxic vapors and electrostatic hazards in the event of destruction
of the vehicle. This possibility must be taken into account and may affect ascent and
recovery trajectory design.

Risk Mitigation Systems
Risk Mitigation Systems are used to reduce the hazard presented by launch
vehicles. Aside from remote location of the launch complexes, evacuations, and
trajectory shaping, the most common risk mitigation approach now used for ELVs is
deliberate explosive destruction of errant vehicles. For U.S. launch vehicles this takes
two forms: commanded destruction and destruction by the vehicle's Inadvertent
Separation System (ISS). In commanded destruction, a UHF radio signal is initiated by
the Missile Flight Control Officer when tracking sources reveal the vehicle is determined
to be crossing predetermined destruct lines or that the vehicle is obviously out of control.
The ISS activates and destroys the vehicle if the system indicates that the stages are
separating. In either case, the destruct signal initiates an explosive destruction of the
vehicle, terminates thrust, and ensures burning and/or intermixing of liquid propellants.
The range safety trajectory requirements and other safety design requirements ensure
that should the vehicle spontaneously explode or be commanded to destruct, any debris
will not fall in a manner which endangers life and property.
Explosive destruct systems are the standard technique for current ELVs and
have been such for over 50 years, but are somewhat undesirable for RLV's, particularly
large SSTO vehicles. Such RLVÕs do not have the separable stages which tend to
increase the risk, but as a consequence are much larger than any other single
component ever launched. Explosive destruction would produce a large debris pattern
and endanger a wider area. While this is not particularly significant for over-water
trajectories, it is a problem for land over flight. On the other hand, impact of the entire
vehicle in the open ocean is not a problem for over-water flights, either. What is needed
is a single approach which will satisfy all missions and trajectories. The ability of RLVs to
abort offers one alternative to explosive destruction.
RLVs now being planned will be autonomous vehicles and will not normally
receive guidance instructions from the ground, but will likely use the Global Positioning
System (GPs), probably with Differential GPS (DGPS) augmentation from ground
stations during the landing phase. RLV on-board guidance and health management
systems presumably will be capable of recognizing when the vehicle is unable to
achieve orbit and take the required action, including maneuvering as required, thrust
termination, dumping of propellants, and selecting an appropriate landing site.
While on-board autonomous risk mitigation systems may be redundant and
robust, they are not likely to be judged adequate by and of themselves to ensure safety.
The capability for direct intervention will almost certainly be required. A tiered approach
to risk mitigation is a possible way to handle this issue. For example:
1. A vehicle is tracked by the launch range, determined to be errant, and is
allowed a period to correct itÕs flight path. If it does not, then:
2. A signal is uplinked to command an abort sequence. If this fails, then:

3. The vehicle is commanded to terminate thrust. If this fails:
4. The vehicle is commanded to dispose of itself in a suitable area.
This represents a significant difference from the current approach but should
present no insurmountable technical challenges. If unable to conduct an autonomous
abort, the hazard presented by the vehicle can be reduced to an acceptable level by
commanding it to terminate thrust and Ògo ballisticÓ and/or to dive into the ocean. This is
the approach is planned for the X-34 program, in conjunction with the restriction of flight
operations to over unpopulated areas. The X-34 also has a limited autonomous in-flight
abort capability which allows an unpowered glide-to-landing in some phases of the flight.
For flights within the 28 to 57 degree range normally approved for launches from
CCAS and KSC, disposal can take place in the open ocean and normal Flight Hazard
Area safety procedures should apply (i.e, warning notices to ships and aircraft and
launch area evacuations). However, operators of RLVs would prefer to recover the
vehicle, so suitable emergency landing sites will be required. In order to facilitate
transport of the vehicle back to the launch site, such locations should have ready access
to water transportation; RLVs such as the VentureStar will be too large to enable air
transport to be used. Some potentially suitable emergency landing sites for high
inclination missions have been identified but will require further evaluation. These
include Mayport Naval Air Station at Jacksonville, Florida., Marine Corps Air Station
Beaufort in South Carolina, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point in North Carolina, and
NASA's Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia. For lower inclination missions Homestead Air
Force Base in Florida may be useful, but for those missions the over water nature of the
flight enables a huge variety of "disposal" options.
For inclinations above 57 degrees such as sun-synchronous missions, launches
from CCAS or KSC will require a new approach to risk mitigation. During the early
portion of the trajectory, the vehicle is over the ocean and can either abort back to the
launch base or dispose of itself in the open water. Normal Flight Hazard Area safety
procedures should apply. During the later portions of the flight the vehicle can either
abort to orbit or have the performance to reach a suitable landing area or a water
disposal area. The primary concern is during that portion of the flight just after the
vehicle crosses the Georgia coastline. In the event the vehicle cannot reach the other
principle emergency landing sites, suitable sites for emergency landing should be
identified. Such sites should have long runways and offer approaches over relatively
unpopulated areas. Military bases are preferred due to ready availability of emergency
response capabilities, airspace control, and security. Possible choices include North
Field, S.C., Myrtle Beach Jetport, S.C. and the former Donaldson Air Force Base near
Greenville, S.C. Due to the difficulty in recovering large RLVs from these sites, they
should be used for emergency flight termination use only, as an alternative to destruction
of the vehicle.

Landing and Recovery Operations
During normal landing operations, the allowable flight paths and associated
safety precautions will depend upon the hazard presented by the vehicle. RLVs making
unpowered landings, such as gliding recoveries, should be able to use either the CCAS
Skid Strip or KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) with a relatively little impact to other
activities in a manner similar to the Space Shuttle. RLVs making powered, vertical
landings will presumably have more explosive potential and probably will require
precautions similar to the launch phase, including the creation of a landing Flight Hazard
Area with associated evacuations.

For recovery of horizontal landing RLVs a suitable runway will be required.
Potentially, either the CCAS Skid Strip or the KSC SLF could be utilized. The SLF is
concrete and is suitable for contact with cryogenics or hypergols. The Skid Strip is
asphalt and is not suitable for such contact. From the safety standpoint, the runway
material should not be a limiting factor, since with proper planning and procedures it
would require a catastrophic event to cause propellants to impact the runway. Should
an RLV land on the Skid Strip and require post-landing defueling operations, it would be
best done at a concrete pad to one side of the Skid Strip, probably on the dedicated
taxiway to the launch pad.
In terms of other hazards, if the vehicle or support equipment has the potential to
spill more than one pint of hypergolic fuels (such as Hydrazine), Toxic Hazard Corridors
will have to be established and provisions made for access to protective equipment for
the ground crew.

Implications for Range Instrumentation
If a multi-tiered approach to commanded risk mitigation is adopted, range
instrumentation systems must be modified. This does not appear to be particularly
challenging in terms of technology, but will require revised approaches to depicting the
vehicle status. Close integration of vehicle control and range safety functions will be
vital and may require changes to the Range Operations Control Center.
Support of trajectories outside of the standard Eastern Range limits likely will
require additional range instrumentation. It is very likely that some instrumentation will
be required at any emergency landing sites. Space-based instrumentation may offer
one solution to these requirements but analyses will be required to confirm the ability to
communicate with the vehicle during re-entry.

Summary and Conclusion
RLVs, regardless of their specific design characteristics, present potentially
significant hazards to launch area personnel and the general public. The risks
presented by these hazards must be mitigated.
The traditional approaches developed to handle expendable launch vehicles and
the Space Shuttle are appropriate for application to RLVs, with some modification. For
operation within established launch azimuths RLVs during ascent look essentially
identical to ELVs and safety issues can be dealt with in much the same manner.
However, the ability of RLVs to posses a credible abort capability requires changes in
the range safety approach to risk mitigation.
Due to their abort capability and lack of expendable stages, RLVs potentially can
utilize trajectories which would not be allowable for ELVs. A key to realizing such
additional capabilities will be the development of suitable disposal techniques in the
event of a failure during ascent during a period which precludes either achieving orbit or
reaching a primary recovery site. Realistically, such trajectories will not be allowed
before the vehicle has demonstrated a relatively high degree of reliability.

Most other safety aspects of RLV operation are simpler and less risky than ELV
operations, but new factors such as possible differences in toxic hazards presented must
be taken into account.
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